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25 TV: A Case Study of the Media During the Egyptian Uprising 
 











This case study examines 25 TV, an Egyptian television network named after the uprising that began on January 
24, 2011, and the programs that attempted to combine social media use and more traditional broadcasting 
techniques. The examination looks at the Egyptian government involvement in broadcasting before, during, and 
after the uprising; the difficulties created by this structure; and the results of a survey of 25 TV staff about their 




Most Western media referred to the Egyptian uprising as a revolution of social media, particularly Facebook and 
Twitter.  
 
After the ouster of then-President Hosni Mubarak, Wael Ghonim, a marketing manager for Google who had 
created an important Facebook page during the uprising, said social media had been the backbone of the success. 
“This revolution started on Facebook, Ghonim said upon the ouster of Mubarak in February 2011. “I’ve always 
said that if you want to liberate a society, just give them the Internet.” (Smith, 2011, para.5) 
 
At the outset, most people outside of Egypt were familiar with the use of Information and Communications 
Technologies during the uprising. What is less clear is how many Egyptians were familiar with these 
technologies. For example, “The 6 April Youth Movement,” which used an Egyptian Facebook group, supported 
workers in an industrial town in the Nile Delta called El-Mahalla. Another Facebook group, “We Are All Khaled 
Saeed,” began after an Alexandria youth was beaten to death by two Egyptian police officers after he was arrested 
at a cybercafé. Photos of Saeed’s body in the morgue went viral online and were seen my Google’s Ghonim, who 
put up the website anonymously. During the protests against Mubarak that began on January 25, 2011, the use of 
ICTs generated texts, emails, photos, and video that documented what was happening in Cairo’s Tahrir Square 
and elsewhere.  
 
The mantra became organize on Facebook, communicate on Twitter, and tell the world on YouTube.  
 
But Mohamed Gohar, a longtime television producer in Egypt, knew social media had to be combined with 
television because few in the country participated in or had access to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or similar 
outlets. As a result, Gohar created 25 TV, a television network that tried to bridge the gap between traditional 
media and social outlets.  
 




At the outset, it is important to understand the role of the media in Egyptian society. Under Presidents Gamal 
Adbel Nasser (1954-1970) and President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), the state owned and supervised all media and 
used them to promote the government’s positions. Private Egyptian broadcast outlets, magazines, and newspapers 
were illegal. Although a similar system worked for many years when Mubarak took power in 1981 after Sadat’s 
assassination, the administration faced the challenge of ICTs. The first state-owned satellite communications 
company, Nilesat, was launched in 1996.  
 
Terrestrial broadcasting remained almost entirely a state monopoly, with a vast network of stations operating under the 
structure of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, which was established in 1979.  
 
 
In terms of television, ERTU operates two national terrestrial stations, six local channels covering 27 governates, and 
three satellite channels. (UNESCO, 2013, p. 13)  




In 2001, the government licensed Dream TV, the first of several private satellite channels owned by members of 
Mubarak’s close associates. These channels provided mainly entertainment and were prohibited from presenting 
news. In 2005, the Mubarak government allowed the licensing of the first private newspaper in Egypt, Al Masry Al 
Youm.  
 
Despite this seeming “liberalization” of the Egyptian media, the key word here is licensing. Whatever the 
government gave, the government also could take away if the owners crossed a political line that the government 
imposed.  
 
Throughout the period from 1952 to 2011, journalists knew how to behave toward the government and also how to 
earn money by toeing the line. In the book Hurriya’alaal-Hamish [Freedom on the Margins], journalist Karim 
Yehia reported how corrupt the media and their journalists had become. In one of the chapters, entitled “The 
Hijacked Syndicate: On the bureaucracy and isolated leaders,” Yehia detailed insider deals and bribery that had 
become rampant among the members of the journalists’ syndicate, which included print reporters and editors. 
(Berger, 2003, p. 15) 
 
As Berger notes in her assessment of the Egyptian Journalist Syndicate: 
  
…the deterioration of the syndicate’s leadership from “leaders of bridges” between the state and people 
in the seventies to the corrupt “nationalistic leaders” and “isolated leaders” in the eighties and through 
the Mubarak era. With insider deals and bribery rampant in so many other sectors, it became politically 
expedient for party players and regular journalists to buy into the game too. “The work of the syndicate 
came to resemble [that of ] asimsaar, or smalltime broker, selling the authorities to the people, and 
selling the journalists to the ruling powers,” Yehia writes. (Berger, p. 5) 
 
Simply put, this historical backdrop provided few independent journalists and voices except for those who had set 
up Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and other social media to provide information to people during the 
Egyptian uprising. But that did not necessarily mean that those engaged in social media could extend these 
practices into a bona fide journalistic strategy, Moreover, the governments—the two military takeovers and 
former President Mohamed Morsi—established tighter control over the media and engaged in attacks—both 
through the law and through violence—against the budding journalistic independence.   
 
After Mubarak’s ouster the transitional period headed by the Supreme Council for Armed Forces witnessed 
attacks on journalists. During the 18-day demonstrations in Tahrir Square and related protests, attacks targeting 
journalists included a journalist killed by a sniper and attacks against journalists from Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, The 
Associated Press, the BBC, CBS, CNN, Danish TV, and others, according to the according to Freedom House’s 
annual report in 2013. Freedom House then changed Egypt’s freedom of the press status to “Partly Free” in 2012 
to “Not Free” in 2013. The report changed the status because of the following: 
 
…due to officially tolerated campaigns to intimidate journalists, increased efforts to prosecute reporters 
and commentators for insulting the political leadership or defaming religion, and intensified polarization 
of the pro– and anti–Muslim Brotherhood press, which reduced the availability of balanced coverage. 
(Freedom House, 2013, para. 1) 
 
After the election of Morsi, the crackdown on the media intensified. According to Freedom House, the 2012 
constitution, pushed aggressively by Morsi and the Islamist groups, included prison sentences for journalistic 
malpractice—restrictions that existed under Mubarak. The Morsi government targeted its critics with such 
lawsuits. For example, Islam Afifi, the editor of Al-Dostour, was charged with publishing lies about the president 
and endangering national stability and security. The Arab Network For Human Rights Information, a Cairo-based 
human rights watchdog, listed more than 20 criminal cases for insulting Morsi during the first six months after his 
election. The Freedom House report added that under Morsi, more state media employees were subjected to 
professional investigation than in the 18 months of the first military rule, targeting those who provided outlets for 
critics of the president and his government. Security personnel targeted dozens of journalists in Alexandria in 
May 2012 while covering protests, and threats to journalists who criticized the Muslim Brotherhood increased 
significantly.  
 
By December 2012, clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi escalated on the street, leading to the 
death of one journalist, Al-Husseiny Abu Deif, and the injury of several others. Two foreign reporters were also 
attacked.  




Supporters of Islamist groups besieged the Media Production City, targeting journalists who were critical of the 
Morsi government. After the military’s ouster of the Morsi regime in July 2013, the situation did not improve. 
2013 proved to be the deadliest for journalists in Egypt, with 12 documented reports of journalists killed as a 
direct result of their work in the field. The forced dispersal of the pro-Morsi protests in August 2013 in Rabaa in 
caused the death of eight reporters after the military had again taken power. Four other reporters lost their lives 
while covering clashes throughout the year. (Freedom House, para. 15) 
 
The laws governing freedom of speech did not witness a significant change in 2013. While the Press Freedom 
Index issued by Reporters without Borders showed a minimal improvement in Egypt’s ranking to 158 from 166 
the previous year, the report stresses that the country has maintained a “deplorable” ranking near the bottom of the 
179 countries on the list, with physical attacks on journalists, trials, and lack of transparency. (Bakr, 2014, para. 
23)  
 
The military closed several Islamist and pro-Morsi satellite channels, including Al-Jazeera, Mubashir Misr, and 
the Brotherhood-owned Misr 25, for having allegedly incited violence. Many have charged that the religious 
channels adopted an extreme discourse that portrayed the opposition to Morsi as infidels, traitors, and “fulul” 
[remnants of the old regime]. (Shahine, 2013, para. 32)  
 
The Role of Social Media in the 2011 Uprising 
 
Even though popular media seized on the importance of technology, including two books, Distant Witness by 
Andy Carvin, formerly of National Public Radio, and Citizens Rising: Independent Journalism and the Spread of 
Democracy by David Hoffman, media researchers have downplayed the significance of Facebook, Twitter, and 
other social media outlets as longstanding trends in the Egyptian media and the uprising. 
 
One 2012 study puts the issues rather succinctly. 
 
While there is a significant amount of debate as to whether cyberactivism currently has an influential role 
in promoting actual change and boosting political transformation, even the critics and skeptics agree that 
cyberactivism does have a great deal of potential to influence meaningful social and political change in 
the future….The continuity and consistence of the cyberactivists' potential to bring about political change 
will largely depend on their ability to successfully organize and debate controversial and complicated 
issues. (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2012, para. 51)  
 
Two British researchers, drawing on technical data and interviews, also found a lack of importance for social 
media, primarily because they only reached on sector of the population: the intelligentsia. 
 
…despite the media hype about “Facebook Revolutions,” the Egyptian activists we interviewed rightly 
reject simplistic claims that technology some how caused the 2011 uprisings, and they say it undermines 
the agency of the millions of people who participated in the movement that brought down Hosni 
Mubarak. (Aouragh &Alexander, 2011, p. 1344) 
 
As the researchers accurately point out, the Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
counted 23 million broadband Internet users out of a population of 83 million and nine million mobile-phone 
Internet users—many of whom may be from the same educated and/or wealthier population. About 30% of 
households have Internet connections. Analysts found at the time of the uprising, less than 1% of all Egyptians 
had Twitter accounts. (Aouragh & Alexander, p. 1347)  
 
The Center for International Media Assistance issued a report a year after the Egyptian uprising in which it 
expressed optimism and caution about the use of social media in building democratic regimes.  
 
…these were not Facebook or Twitter revolutions, however much cyberutopians would like them to be. 
However, the Internet’s potential as a tool that can help the process of democratization is undeniable, and 
of course the Internet also can be used for oppression by authoritarian governments in the Arab world and 




The author notes the need for an ethical structure and journalistic training for those using social media. The report 
includes complaints that user-generated contest proved difficult to authenticate and lacked standards of accuracy, 
although some media outlets like 25 TV had started such training programs (Ghannam, 2012, p. 9).  
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A recent review of 150 academic publications criticizes the overzealousness by researchers of placing too great an 
emphasis on the role of social media in the uprisings.   
 
There is a more durable tendency in the academic literature and media discourse surrounding the 
uprisings to invest emotionally in them and to project specific political commitments….That is not to 
suggest the reform movements cannot be powerful agents of historic change but simply that there is 
nothing intrinsically about a protest culture, network, or space that is politically fertile or generative of 




25 TV was named after the date the revolution against the Mubarak regime began on January 25, 2011.  
 
“The idea came when I was watching all the first 18 days of the revolution. Mohamed Gohar said in an interview 
with the author. “We were all shocked and impressed by the power used by the young people to start the Egyptian 
revolution. On the day Mubarak stepped down I saw it as a great opportunity to use these young people to create a 
new media in Egypt with new ideas and new innovation.” (Gohar, personal communication, December 27, 2013)  
 
But Gohar, who had built 14 networks throughout the Middle East, said the need after the uprising was to 
translate the success of social media in reporting and organizing the demonstrations throughout the country into a 
journalistic enterprise. According to the CIA, more than 25% of the Egyptian people are illiterate and about 80% 
have no connection to the Internet. (The World Factbook, 2014) 
 
Therefore, social media would not be an effective means to reach many of the 83 million Egyptians. He said he 
decided to create a television network to bridge the gap between the youth on social media and many other 
Egyptians who did not have access.  
 
As noted earlier, no private broadcast licenses were issued in Egypt until 2001. Only government channels could 
transmit news and entertainment, but the Mubarak government granted licenses to individuals, mainly 
businessmen with close ties to the regime, for entertainment channels. That changed slightly during the period just 
after Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011. As UNESCO notes in its 2013 report: 
 
In the early days of the revolution, a number of measures were taken to enhance media freedom. The 
Ministry of Information was effectively put into abeyance, and key figures in a number of ministries and 
other bodies, including the Journalist Syndicate and the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, were 
replaced. Many rules limiting media freedom were also effectively suspended, while others were widely 
flouted. The sometimes-informal rules, as well as the practices, regarding media licensing were 
significantly relaxed, and new media outlets were authorized to operate. (UNESCO, p. 6) 
 
The license that Gohar obtained came through the State Information and Press Department in the Ministry of 
Information. He could not obtain a license to broadcast directly inside of Egypt, so he applied as a foreign 
company through a connection to a Bahrain satellite. That transmission then went through the Egyptian Media 
Production City, which is located about 100 miles north of Cairo. The broadcast satellite cost 25 TV about 
$24,000 a month.  
 
According to its website, Nilesat provides broadcasting services for both television and radio within the coverage 
of its satellites. Nilesat said it broadcasts 700 television channels, but it also provides a central location to stop 
outlets the government deems illegal or inappropriate—as has happened with 25 TV and other channels. (Nilesat, 
2014, para. 1) 
 
Gohar contacted 24 individuals whose work he saw on social media to start the network, combining the reports of 
the bloggers, videographers, and others in Tahrir Square. Many of them accepted the invitation and worked with 
professional journalists and videographers to create the network.  
 
25 TV started with about 50 people in the Cairo newsroom and one-person news operations, who did audio, blogs, 
and video throughout the country—eventually growing to about 100 people. The network started with a soft 
launch of one to two hours a day on the air in February 2011, mainly news bulletins, and became a 24/7 operation, 
including rebroadcasts on April 6, 2011. The network added a website, streaming audio and video—both in  
 
Arabic and English—and a YouTube channel. Eventually, 25 TV broadcast 25 different programs from politics to 
sports, including 65% of the content in live broadcasts during the day.  
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“The goals of 25 TV were supporting the goals of the revolution and calling for constructive dialogue and positive 
change, supporting civilian-based rights and responsibilities,” Gohar said in an interview with the author. “We 
were talking to people who no other media talked to at all. They got the message.” (Gohar, personal 
communication)  
 
Following are some of the other goals presented to advertisers and investors: 
 
--In the Middle East, many people believe that the West has long supported dictatorships and adhered to double 
standards when it comes to the promotion of democracy. A new approach started in the social media and 
moved to 25 TV that was ready to develop and emphasize the West's present-day support for democracy, 
helping change the public’s perception. 
--Focus on the West's efforts to support human rights around the world. For example, highlighting the efforts of 
the West and international monitors who surveyed Egypt’s presidential elections. 
--Focus on the importance of the rule of law by doing extensive coverage of court cases and highlighting the 
West’s lead in that area. 
--The West must be willing to be accountable to the Middle East by demonstrating that it is concerned about the 
lives of people in this region and is committed to their well being. 
--Promote stability that leads to democracy, which is the only true path to freedom.  
--Produce programs that highlight similarities to build trust between people and cultures. 
--Comprehensive settlement between the Arab World and Israel is in the best interest for both sides. In the past, 
the world thought a comprehensive settlement would lead to better governments in the Arab World. We 
believe the opposite. Under a well-functioning democracy, people will see it is in their interest to have peace.  
--The Egyptian media should promote peace by giving a voice to the Israeli people more than the government. 
The news about Israel should be unbiased and covered in the same way as it would in any other country.  
--Shed light on terrorist activities without excusing the violence. Produce programs that contradict the terrorists’ 
ideas and convince fundamentalists to renounce their views, and respect and embrace equality and human 
rights. (Gohar, personal communication) 
  
Gohar also insisted on applying journalistic standards of objectivity, fairness, and balance—standards he learned 
while working for NBC News in Cairo.  
 
25 TV launched its first live broadcast on April 1, 2011, from Tahrir Square, where it provided special coverage 
for a Friday protest, which was called “Saving the Revolution.” The protestors called for all of the revolution’s 
demands to be met and for a democratic Egypt to be established. 
 
On its first official broadcast on April 6, 2011, the network decided to broadcast live from the city of El-Mahalla 
in the Nile Delta to commemorate the “6th of April Strike” in 2006,which sparked the first public labor action in 
Egypt’s history, calling for the improvement of the country’s political, social, and economic status.   
 
On April 25, the station decided to revive the spirit of Sinai Liberation Day, broadcasting live from Al Arish with 
a host of programs that shed light on Al Arish’s unique characteristics. One program, “Sammani” [Talk to Me], 
explored one of the few remaining tunnels that provided a way to provide humanitarian supplies into Rafah, a 
Palestinian city under Israeli control in the Gaza Strip. Another program, “Ala Fein” [Where To?], broadcast the 
stories of Sinai’s youth and their struggle with the previous regime. “Kol Youm,” [Every Day] 25 TV’s daily talk 
show, invited village elders, and young men and women from Sinai to present their desire for a more developed, 
democratic society. 
 
One important confrontation between 25 TV and the Egyptian government, which at the time was under military 
rule after the resignation of Mubarak, occurred on October 9, 2011, when the military killed an estimated 28 
people and injured more than 200 when Coptic Christians protested outside of the offices of Egyptian state 
television near 25 TV in Maspero in central Cairo. 
 
The Copts, who represent an estimated 10% of the 83 million Egyptians, marched in protest against the 
destruction on September 30 of Mar Girgis [St. George] Church in Marinab near Aswan. (Human Rights Watch, 
2011, para. 11) 
 
 
Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 participants in the demonstration who testified that at least two armored 
personnel vehicles “drove recklessly through crowds of demonstrators, in some cases appearing to pursue them 
intentionally.”  
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The organization disputed the claims of state-run Channel One, Nile News, and Radio Misr, which had reported 
that the demonstrators had killed three soldiers—a claim later found to be untrue—and called upon citizens to 
defend the attacks against the military. 
 
“Such calls could easily have been taken as a signal for citizens to attack Copts and therefore would have 
amounted to incitement to discrimination and violence against Copts,” Human Rights Watch said. 
 
 
Dina Rasmy, a newscaster on state television’s Channel Two, declared later in a statement posted on Facebook 
that she was “ashamed” of working for state media, which, she said, "had proven itself to be a slave for whoever 
rules Egypt. 
 
"Rasmy added that national television was effectively encouraging civil war by encouraging Egyptians to go to 
Maspero to support the army against what it called "Christian aggressors." (Gundy, 2011) 
 
 
25 TV broadcast the demonstration until Egyptian military police entered the offices of Video Cairo, the 
headquarters of the television outlet. In some cases, staff members exchanged identity cards, which designate 
religion, with Sunnis taking papers from Christians and, in some cases, were beaten. Seventeen protestors, 
including a Coptic priest, sought refuge in the building and were subsequently smuggled out of the area over the 
next day, wearing clothes and equipment from 25 TV. (Gohar, personal communication). 
 
 
The network also moved quickly to cover major news events, including having much of its schedule devoted to 
significant stories, such as the massive riot at the stadium in Port Said, Egypt, on February 1, 2012. The incident 
happened after a soccer match between Al-Masry of Port Said and Al-Ahly of Cairo. At least 79 people were 
killed and more than 1,000 people were injured after the game when Al-Ahly fans were attacked with various 
weapons 
  
The New York Times and Egyptian sources reported that the riots served as retaliation on the part of the authorities 
toward the so-called “ultras,” or supporters of the Cairo team who were actively involved in the demonstrations in 
Tahrir Square. (Kirkpatrick, 2012, para. 2)  
 
The most popular show on 25 TV, “El Sit Ghalya” [Lady Ghalya], centered on Ghalya Alia Mahmoud, an 
Egyptian maid who provided cooking tips and political commentary. Gohar plucked Mahmoud from his sister’s 
kitchen, where she was working as a maid and cook. At home, she fed 15 people from her family on an income of 
less than $200 a month. Her show and her meals focused on typical Egyptian food, such as the fava-bean dish 
known as “ful” on a budget of $4 a day. The diet included mainly vegetables and bread, with a once-a-week 
serving on Fridays of meat.  
 
On her show, Mahmoud mixed dishes and political commentary in a kitchen not unlike her one at home. She 
cooked with tin pots on propane burners and did not bother with measuring cups. All of the ingredients came from 
the Cairo markets near her home. “Does she feel sorry for Mr. Mubarak?” one caller asked her during a program. 
“Yes, as sorry as he felt for me when he was in power.” Such tongue-in-cheek responses made her a star.  
 
The program began on August 1, 2011, at the beginning of Ramadan, the holy month when Muslims fast from 
dawn to dusk and then start eating as much as possible until the next day. “All women can cook. They’re smart, 
and they can do anything if they try,” Mahmoud told The Washington Post. (Fadel, 2012, para. 8) 
 
On camera, Mahmoud seamlessly handled the cooking tasks and the political chitchat. Dressed in colorful 
dresses, an apron, and a headscarf, she became so popular that men proposed to her even though they knew she 
was married. Children called into the show for tips on dealing with parents. Wealthy women dialed the program 
to ask about traditional dishes. 
  
The messages on her show provided even more important lessons than her recipes. She offered to give dietary 
information to Coptic Christians, who abstain from meat and dairy products during their time of fasting. She said 
she did it to prove that heightened sectarian tensions, which she said she believed were stirred up by the 
government, didn’t exist in Egyptian neighborhoods. 
 
“The government only treated the crème de la crème with respect, and the rest of us were invisible,” she told The 
Washington Post. “I have so much hope that for my two girls, the country will be different,” (Fadel, para. 17) 
 
Following were some of the other important programs that aired on 25 TV: 
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25 TV News Bulletin 
 
The news bulletin was 25 TV’s special addition to Egypt’s media landscape. 25 TV was committed to providing 
unbiased, independent, and objective reporting of the facts. The bulletin followed local and international events 
and focused on giving voice to all sectors, parties, and groups regardless of political or religious affiliation. 
 
“Meshwar Lelmidan” – [A Trip to the Square] 
 
“Meshwar Lelmidan” was a 30-minute socio-political show that aired three days per week. The program followed 
young people who have participated in the uprising in different capacities as political activists, interest groups, 
artists, or even average citizens who had compelling stories to tell. Each episode included a trip to Tahrir Square, 
with videos or photos of incidents and events that occurred during the uprising, provided by guests or taken from 
the 25 TV library. The guests told their part of the story of each photo or video. 
 
“Kol Youm” – [Every Day] 
 
“Kol Youm” was a one-hour-long daily socio-political talk show focused on current internal affairs as well as 
important events on the international scene. It aimed to provide viewers with information through video reports, 
interviews, and eyewitness accounts. The show helped build informed public opinion through unbiased 
professional reporting of events. Three young Egyptians who were all involved in the uprising and had no 
experience working in media before this program presented the show. Their genuine and honest interest in 




This 15-minute daily show aired five days per week. The show’s name was derived from the hashtags used most 
commonly on Twitter. “#Hashtag” covered information from the Internet that the average viewer might not be 
familiar with. It covered everything from online blogs to citizen journalism and social networks, including 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. The program aimed to bring what people were reporting, saying, and doing 
online to the television screen in an effort to familiarize the wider public with the Internet. 
 
Miral Brinjy, a young Internet and social media activist who participated in the revolution since the first day 
presented “#Hashtag.” Miral had a degree in political science and international law, and she began blogging 
anonymously in 2006.  
 
“Dalil” – [Guide] 
 
“Dalil” was a 30-minute political talk show that provided viewers with reports on the country’s current events and 
affairs through talking to average citizens about their lives and needs. It then used these reports to ask presidential 
candidates about their platforms.  
 
“Sama3ny” – [Talk to Me] 
 
“Sama3ny” was a 30-minute reality show that aired three days per week. The program followed Sief Krfan, the 
presenter, as he pursued his favorite hobby: searching for people, groups, or initiatives adopting positive ideas for 
change. Krfan addressed his viewers directly, sharing his thoughts and feelings on each story. 
 
Krfan was a young physician, who worked during the uprising at the field hospital in Tahrir Square. While 
helping the injured, he was shot in the back by riot police. But that didn’t stop him. Despite his injury, he 
continued to help others. His experiences led him to start listening to different people’s stories. He followed these 
stories back to their roots and took steps to obtain positive change using the information he’d gathered. 
 
“Alsha3b Yurid” – [The People Demand] 
 
“Alsha3b Yurid” was a 30-minute political reality show that aired three days per week. The show followed the 
host as he traveled around the country to talk to people from different backgrounds and ideologies who had 
legitimate demands, giving them the opportunity to express their problems and concerns as well as issues 
affecting their daily lives. The show attempted to convey people’s demands and needs to the responsible parties, 
hoping to make a difference and create change. The show ended every episode with a brief commentary by the 
presenter. 
 
Ez El Din, the host, participated in the uprising. While he was documenting the dramatic and violent incidents on 
February 28, 2011, he was shot in his right eye. A pellet still sits in his right eye and can’t be removed due to the 
danger of the operation.  
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 “7ala 3agbana” – [A State We Like] 
 
“7ala 3agbana” was 30-minute cultural and artistic show that aired twice per week. The show featured young 
Egyptian artists working in various fields, including visual and video art, music, and film. The show followed 
artists at concerts, galleries, studios, and other places that inspired them.  
 
“7ala 3agbana” covered art events and artists across the country and helped to raise the profile and awareness of 
contemporary Egyptian art, acknowledging the importance of art as a tool for change.  
 
“Welad Baladna” – [Sons and Daughters of Our Country] 
 
“Welad Beladna” was a one-hour socio-political debate show that aired five days a week, featuring rotating 
presenters from the channel. The show presented youth representing various groups, initiatives, and political 
parties in each episode to discuss and answer questions related to their involvement in forging change and 
advocating policies based on their differing agendas.  
 
“El Basta” – [The Porch] 
 
“El Basta” was a one-hour weekly music show, which was filmed with young independent music groups and 
bands in an interactive context with a small group of their fans in an informal and friendly “MTV Unplugged” 
type setting. The show featured bands that performed in Tahrir Square during the uprising along with other 
talented young musicians, and aimed at providing audiences across Egypt and the Arab world with an opportunity 
to see and hear music with which they were not previously familiar. The show was presented by the musicians 
themselves who provided insights into their music and talked about the tracks before they performed. 
 
“Kamin” – [Roadblock] 
 
“Kamin” was a 20-minute weekly action reality show that followed police at roadblocks while they processed 
different vehicles as well as searches and arrests. The show also followed police officers on raids and arrests to 
raise the viewers’ awareness of the dangers surrounding the police throughout their daily work and the different 
various procedures they followed in the different situations they faced. 
 
“Al Gisr” – [The Bridge] 
 
This weekly religious program aimed at bridging Coptic Christianity and Islam with sheikh and a priest. 
 
“Ara’a” – [Views] 
 
This program was based on a weekly survey. It asked one question every week to the different categories of the 
viewers in order to measure public opinion about one of the current issues in politics, economics, or social life. 
 
“Ma’a” – [Together] 
 
This program used the research and experts from a think tank to analyze the week’s top news stories in the 
Egyptian media. 
 
“Ibn El Hetta”- [Area Man] 
 
The program gave viewers information about the Egyptian parliamentary elections. The program covered the 
candidates, the platforms, their ideas, and the voters’ opinions. The program gave viewers minute-by-minute 
coverage of the elections, the results, and public sentiment. 
 
“Formet El Sahel”- [Getting in Shape] 
 
Formet El Sahel was a 30-minute weekly sports show that offered viewers complete guidance on how to get in 
shape. Through easy instructions explained by a professional trainer, the show helped viewers achieve physical 
fitness. 
 
“Lahza be Lahza”- [Moment by Moment] 
 
This daily program offered a preview of the day's top stories from several perspectives. It also aimed to highlight 




Soura was a 30-minute and sometimes a one-hour weekly investigative program that discussed the media in 
Egypt, particularly as they operated before the January 25 uprising. The program aimed to root out corruption as it 
manifested itself in various forms of the media.  
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The presenter of the show was a seasoned journalist, who, through exclusive interviews and in-depth research, 





This 30-minute weekly cultural show featured young Egyptian artists. Each week, guest artists appeared on the 
program to discuss their art, their past, and their vision for the future. Each young artist was given the opportunity 
to express his or her dream for the future of art and culture in Egypt. Also, each episode wrapped up with an 
exhibition displaying the artwork of featured guests. “Star” gave a voice to Egypt’s artistic youth, putting their 
work in the spotlight and allowing the next generation to weigh in on important cultural issues. 
 
“Takareer”- [Reports]  
 
This journalistic special reviewed a group of reports that were shot on location. The show filmed the most 
important current events and developments and then reviewed different opinions on the topic. It also looked at the 




An anonymous electronic survey was sent to 72 former employees of 25 TV via surveymonkey.com. Twenty-
three people responded, or a rate of 32%. The results seemed relatively consistent with the profile of most 
employees.  
 
The predominant age group was between 25 and 34, which included 14 of those surveyed, or 61%. All except one 
respondent was younger than 54. Those who responded included 64% men and 36% women, generally a much 
higher percentage of females than much of the Egyptian media. The group included 23% who worked as 
reporters, 41% as producers, 14% as technical staff, and the rest in a variety of other positions.  
 
The political views centered on secular and democratic, with responses of 36% for the former and 59% for the 
latter. No one selected an affiliation with the religious parties, while 9% described themselves as pro-Mubarak 
and 13% chose pro-military. 
  
The respondents engaged in a high level of the use of social media, with all using Facebook. About 50% used 
Twitter, 18%were on Instagram, and 9% also employed other platforms. 
  
In responses to the reason the individuals joined 25 TV, a genuine excitement exuded from nearly all the people. 
The respondents talked about the need for impartial news that reached all sectors of Egyptian society. One 
individual noted: “25 TV was a unique TV initiative in Egypt. It had a clear vision that was reflected in the 
channel's programs, strategy, and working environment. The channel had a unique combination of adhering to 
top-notch news reporting and TV production standards, policies, and ethics while representing and engaging huge 
but marginalized demographics of the Egyptian population such as youth, the working class, and citizens from 
towns and suburbs outsize of the country's capital, Cairo.” 
 
The team seemed extremely proud of the quality of the news production, with 14 out of 18 rating the quality of 
the information as good or excellent. The difficulty, according to the respondents, centered on the political 
influence of 25 TV. More than half of the respondents rated the influence as fair or poor.  
 
 
Nearly all of those who responded remained with 25 TV until it closed in October 2012. Now it is apparent that 
they see little positive about the news sources available to them. More than 90% rated state media as fair or poor, 
while 72% gave private news programs, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, similar marks. 
 
The respondents would like to see a democratically elected government, with only one favoring the continuation 
of the military control. One respondent covered many of the comments put forward by colleagues. The important 
issues of this individual included: 
 
--Strict law enforcement regarding violence crimes, violence against women and fraud; 
--Effective clear development plans in agriculture, manufacturing, education, and health care; 
--More freedoms to, support for, and cooperation with civil society organizations; 
--Holding government officials and employees as well as private corporations accountable for their actions and 
decisions. 
 
In final comments about the experience at 25 TV, many longed for a return of the network—something that is 
unlikely to happen anytime soon.  
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One respondent put it this way: “Like many before me, I consider myself lucky to have known, worked, and 
learned from Gohar. His teaching methods while unorthodox are effective for those who are looking to learn 
journalism, media, and their critical socio-political role. Gohar is a visionary, an inspirational figure, and a 





Why did the adaptation of social media to television fail? Why did 25 TV close? 
 
The answers are relatively simple, but the background is not. Advertisers had grown comfortable with state-
owned news broadcast and privately owned entertainment networks. As a result, the advertisers, in Gohar and 
other analysts’ view, boycotted 25 TV. Furthermore, the government headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and then 
the military, which overthrew that government, refused to issue a license to broadcast. Gohar said the Muslim 
Brotherhood government declined to provide a reason, while the military denied the request because it considered 
25 TV “pro-Western and pro-Israel,” he said. (Gohar, personal communication)  
 
But the roots of the end of 25 TV, which had gained a significant audience, went far deeper. Abdallah Schleifer, 
writing for the Saudi-backed Al Arabiya, argues that Egypt lacks the basis for a television network like 25 TV 
because the country’s news media has a decidedly partisan bent. Moreover, the country basically has never 
developed an extensive free press. 
 
Schleifer served as the former bureau chief of NBC News in Cairo and as a professor at the American University 
of Cairo. “[T] hat partisan tone, long predates [Mohamed] Morsi’s presidency, the Arab Spring or even the 
introduction of the printing press in early19th century Cairo,” he writes. (Schleifer, 2013, para. 2) 
 
Under a monarchy in the 19th century, Egypt faced a significant influence from the French, including the arrival 
of Lebanese and Syrian journalists to Egypt, including the Taqla brothers who founded the newspaper Al-
Ahram. The structure centered on partisan politics and continued that way under Nasser, who helped to launch a 
military coup in 1952 and then nationalized the media when he took over the presidency two years later. Nasser 
followed the Soviet example of state ownership of the media not unlike that in the Soviet Union, which 
supported the Egyptian leader. (Schleifer, para. 8) 
 
The author noted that Egypt’s Higher Council for Journalism adopted a code in 1998 in an attempt to reduce 
partisanship. The code recognizes the right of the reader“ to objective journalism that honestly attempts to reflect 
reality and the movement of events and the different opinions, and preserve each citizen’s right to comment on 
printed material and not being used in slandering, black mailing, falsely accusing, or personal insults.” (Schleifer, 
para. 15) 
 
The Mubarak government tolerated some independent newspapers in the final years of his presidency, but the 
journalists often came from the state media, bringing the same values with them, including an absence of 
Western reportorial guidelines, such as objectivity, fairness, or balance. Egyptians—at least those who could 
afford a satellite dish—began to see alternative approaches to news coverage in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
with the arrival of Al-Jazeera. Al Arabiya, and others. Even so, Gohar’s 25 TV, Schleifer writes, went far 
beyond these outlets.  
 
The newsreaders and anchors were young and dressed with the informality of youth. Educated, middle- 
aged Egyptians watching the news bulletins were reminded of their own children as well as struck by the 
lack of bias. (Schleifer, para. 11) 
 
In the latter months of 2012, Gohar discovered that the signal of 25 TV was being jammed from an unknown 
source, probably the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood. After the military ousted Morsi on July 3, 
2013, 25 TV could not receive a license from the new government.  
 
Gohar sees problems with both the Muslim Brotherhood—now banned in Egypt as a terrorist organization and its 
leaders on trial—and the military takeover of July 2013 after a year of Islamic rule.  
 
In an analysis in the midst of the Brotherhood’s rule, Gohar sent out an email to his supporters, which was entitled 
“The Media’s Performance in Egypt and Where It’s Headed.” 
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How do we help the opposition media in Egypt, a country that is becoming increasingly  Islamist, to 
support the nation’s transition to democracy? The same large organizations  and social media players that 
supported massive protests that forced a longtime autocrat from office on February 11, 2011, have 
recently inflamed riots and street protestors. That has hindered the peaceful transition to an open 
democracy. (Gohar, personal communication) 
 
Gohar, whose 25 TV was being constantly jammed at this point, urged calm among demonstrators.  
 
…the media has focused more on the disagreements between protestors, ignoring their larger goals and 
setting back the country’s transition to democracy. Outrageous accusations in the press have created fear 
and encouraged violence. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to control the media and 
inflate the power of the presidency. That has created a situation that could restrict the freedoms of 
minorities, women, and secularists, potentially reducing many people to second-class citizens.  
 
The creator of 25 TV criticized the media for their poor performance in encouraging people to vote in the first 
constitutional referendum, particularly the lack of information about democratic principles, which had not been a 
part of the lives of many Egyptian citizens. “The media ignored the crucial message that the vote offered 
Egyptians an unprecedented freedom of choice. A large bank of voters waiting to be swayed found themselves 
instead alienated from the political process,” he wrote. (Gohar, personal communication)  
 
Moreover, he thought the media had to be more analytical than negative during the Morsi presidency. Also, he 
noted the Muslim Brotherhood’s hold on power was not “a done deal”—an example of his understanding of the 
Egyptian political process.  
 
The mood, which made the Egyptian revolution successful in the eyes of the international media, was the unity of 
many types of people: activists, regular citizens, heads of state, and the MB [Muslim Brotherhood]…The early 
unity that brightened the image of the demonstrators during the first days of the revolution has been obscured. 
(Gohar, personal communication)  
 
The desires of the Egyptian people—such as jobs, social equality, and citizenship—disappeared from the agenda. 
These were the points that foreign media highlighted during the early days of the revolution, but when Egyptians 
set those ideas aside, the main objectives were blurred. The media should return to the key values of the 




For 18 months, 25 TV brought a bright, shining light to Egyptian television in an attempt to reach those who used 
social media and those who did not. The heady days of February 2011 have long since slogged in a period of 
discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood and a return to the dictatorial stance of the military. Neither the Islamists 
nor the military have tolerated a free press—as evidenced by virtually the same promises and then restrictions in 
the latest constitution.  
  
As UNESCO points out in its 2013 report, the power of the government remains strong. 
 
The legal framework, which formally remains almost entirely in place, establishes…control over all of the 
institutional structures established by these laws, such as the Journalist Syndicate, the Supreme Press 
Council, the Egyptian Radio and Television Union and the National Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority. (UNESCO, p. 15) 
 
Furthermore, the arrest and harassment of journalists both domestic and foreign make it unlikely that Egypt will 
see a return to the journalistic vigor of 2011 and 2012 anytime soon.  
 
Nevertheless, the Egypt uprising did see an increased interest in ICTs and the use of social media tools, 
particularly among those in their 20’s and 30’s. UNESCO reported: “There is certainly a vast array of blogs 
operated by Egyptians, both in the country and from abroad, which includes a wide array of political blogs, as 
well as social and personal blogs.” Furthermore, the Arab Social Media Report found the number of Facebook 
users increased by 2 million in the first quarter of 2011, representing 10% of all Internet users. Also, the number 
continued to grow in 2013, with more than 11 million users, or more than 14% of the population and a growth rate 
of 19%. That number includes 86% under 34 years old and 63% male. (UNESCO, p. 15) 
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As outlined earlier, however, a huge number of Egyptians do not participate in social media. Therefore, a 
connective tissue must exist between social media and traditional media. Unfortunately, no radio or television 
outlet has been able to provide what 25 TV did so well during its existence. Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
government authorities will release their grip on the freedom of the press in Egypt. Thus, the necessary 
connection will not occur any time soon.  
 
After numerous death threats and the inability to obtain broadcast licenses for what he set out to do with 25 TV, 
Gohar left Egypt for Canada, where he is engaged in a variety of film and television projects. He sees two 
important components for a free press in Egypt. First, the secular movement—where the use social media is 
high—needs to find a political platform and candidates with whom they agree and can help organize. Second, 
these officials need to force Parliament to provide less restrictive laws to protect freedom of the press to revive 
independent voices throughout the country. Without these fundamental changes, Gohar sees a continuation of 
military rule and the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than an honest debate about the future of the 
country. Then, the use of ICTs and television could join again to bring an honest and open dialogue to a country 
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